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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE 
JAPANESE ACCOUNTING BIG BANG: NEW 
MOTIVATIONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to recent corporate scandals, the United States Congress 
hastily implemented the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, 
Responsibility, and Transparency Act, otherwise known as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.1 The Act implements many new reforms affecting 
auditing standards, corporate governance, and penalties for Security and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) violations. This Note focuses on the 
auditing provisions in these reforms. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effect on auditing is twofold. First, the Act 
establishes a “public oversight” board to monitor the accounting industry 
in the United States.2 This board replaces the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (“FASB”), which previously implemented Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices (“GAAP”) standards under the SEC’s 
command. Second, for the first time, the Act includes an explicit provision 
outlawing the establishment or operation of multidisciplinary practices,3 or 
MDPs, in the United States.4
The United States’ current corporate scandals and the reformatory 
reaction to them can be analogized to scandals and reforms in Japan during 
the last few years. After questionable accounting practices caused many 
Japanese companies to go bankrupt, beginning in 1997, Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance implemented a series of reforms, known as the Japanese Big 
Bang.5 The Ministry intended to promote an auditing system similar to the 
deregulated system in the United States.6 Yet, despite the reforms, the 
Japanese economy has continued to decline.7
 1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. 
 2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2003). 
 3. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g) (West Supp. 2003). 
 5. See infra pp. 940-41. 
 6. METI to Examine Recent Accounting Reforms Given U.S. Scandals, JAPAN ECON. 
NEWSWIRE, July 11, 2002, Westlaw, JAPANECON database. Japan has finished a three-year program 
to make its corporate governance style more like that of the United States, and the European Union is 
pressuring Japan to adopt International Accounting Standards. Id. 
 7. Japan: Time for a Makeover, THE ACCT., June 23, 2001, at 17. Financial reporters have 
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Perhaps the United States can learn from Japan’s mistakes. The 
legislative quick fix of switching between policies of regulation and 
deregulation cannot effectively solve the recurring problem of corporate 
scandals.8 Instead, regulators must focus on a different kind of solution—
the MDPs that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act currently prohibits.9  
MDPs offering audit services, legal services, and tax services provide a 
solution that will prevent future economic disasters like those the United 
States and Japan have recently encountered.10 Combining all of these 
services into a cohesive unit will enhance the industries’ effectiveness and 
discourage future unlawful practices. The MDP system would integrate all 
aspects of the financial consulting industry. While attorneys practicing in a 
MDP would provide legal advice on the potentially unlawful practices 
accountants should avoid, accountants would help attorneys better 
understand complicated accounting structures. This integration would 
create a system of checks and balances—one where the right hand would 
know what the left was doing. Involving more professionals in financial 
transactions will create more opportunities for employees to intervene and 
stop illegal practices before they start. There will also be more potential 
“whistleblowers” if the company engages in illegal practices. As a result, 
investors would learn about fraudulent practices before serious financial 
harm occurs. 
The accounting industry already has many MDPs in place. The Big 
Five accounting firms currently employ a substantial number of attorneys 
in their taxation departments.11 These lawyers are working effectively 
alongside accountants, providing legal advice so the accountants can 
structure effective legal transactions. Further, the integration of taxation 
and financial accounting will ensure that profits are accurately reported. 
commented on Japan’s poor economic recovery: 
[t]he Japanese economy, which for the past decade has been in a state of stagnation, has 
shown no real signs of improvement over the past year or so. The Japanese yen continues to 
remain low against the major world currencies, and earlier in the year the stock market 
plummeted to a 27-month low. Analysts believe that any upturn in the economy would be 
dependent on an increase in consumer spending. At the moment, however, this seems 
unlikely due to economic insecurity and fear of job losses in the country.  
Id. 
 8. See infra notes 51–62 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra pp. 942-43 and note 90. 
 10. See infra pp. 938-40.  
 11. Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1359, 1362 (2000) (noting that Big Five accounting firms employ more than 5,000 attorneys). The Big 
Five firms include: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. See also infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/8
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This will discourage the manipulation of financial statements that has led 
to recent scandals.12  
MDPs are a global solution. The MDP system will work in Japan, the 
United States, and elsewhere. Many countries already recognize MDPs; 
others are integrating them into their accounting practices.13 The United 
States and Japan should follow the lead of more progressive countries in 
implementing these procedures. After analyzing the situations confronting 
the United States and Japan, it is obvious that the answer lies not in 
changing standards, but rather in changing mindsets to welcome MDPs.  
II. HISTORICAL FACTS 
A. In 2002, Congress Passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Address Concern 
Over Corporate and Accounting Scandals in the United States  
1. Largely the Result of Unlawful Accounting Practices, Corporate 
Bankruptcies Caused Scandals Leading to Deep Depressions in the 
United States Economy in 2001 and 2002 
In the past few years, many events have caused the public to distrust 
the accounting industry and corporate America. The Enron Corporation 
declared one of the largest bankruptcies in United States history on 
December 2, 2001.14 In July of 2002, the SEC charged the WorldCom 
Corporation with corporate fraud after the company hid approximately 
$3.9 billion in expenses.15 Other U.S. companies, such as Global Crossing, 
Qwest Communications, Xerox, Tyco, and ImClone, are facing similar 
problems.16  
It seems that questionable accounting practices by corporate auditors 
caused most of these controversies. For example, Enron’s public 
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, admitted that its employees obstructed 
the investigation into the company’s bankruptcy by destroying 
 12. See infra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
 13. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 14. Noelle Knox, Chapter 11 Latest Step for Enron, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1B. Enron 
declared bankruptcy in light of accounting fraud which led to a decline in its stock price and the 
termination of many corporate employees. Id. The stock price dropped from $84.88 to $0.26 in the 
year preceding the bankruptcy. Id. 
 15. Andrew Backover & Thor Valdmanis, WorldCom Report Will Face Scrutiny, USA TODAY 
MAG., July 1, 2002, at 1B (reporting that WorldCom was preparing for an SEC hearing to determine 
what laws the company violated). 
 16. Id. 
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documents.17 However, Andersen decided not to plead guilty to the charge 
of obstruction of justice, for which it was indicted on March 14, 2002.18 
The firm was subsequently tried and convicted of that charge.19
2. The Former GAAP Standards Were Too Stringent and Caused 
Accounting Firms to Find Loop-Holes  
The Enron example demonstrates how the Big Five accounting firms 
are deeply involved in the recent controversies. It is not as if the Enron 
executives were entirely without culpability,20 as Andersen accountants 
audited and approved many of the accounting practices that formed the 
basis of the government’s fraud charges. However, the accountants simply 
applied the standards set for their profession by the FASB.21
Until last year, public accountants in the United States adhered to 
accounting rules commonly referred to as GAAP rules. These rules 
functionally “govern[ed] audit methodology.”22 In other words, they 
operated as guidelines for the accounting industry. The FASB was the 
administrative agency primarily responsible for the creation of the rules23 
 17. Luisa Beltran, Attorney: Andersen Will Admit Fault, Won’t Plead Guilty, CNN.com, Apr. 4, 
2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/04/04/anderson.justice.dept/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 
2004). The accounting firm refused to accept responsibility for Enron’s downfall. Id. However, 
Andersen had also insisted that any culpability is limited to its Houston office. Id.  
 18. Id. Stanley Brand, one of Andersen’s attorneys said, “[w]e would consider something short 
of a guilty plea in court that would demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility.” Id. 
 19. The jury relied on evidence that one employee had already pled guilty to charges. Andersen 
attorneys requested that the judge order a mistrial, but the motion was denied. Even after the motion 
was denied, Andersen partner C.E. Andrews said, “The purpose of this was for us to fight for our 
honor, our dignity. We did not think we committed a crime, we still do not think we committed a 
crime. We respect the process but the process is not over.” Phil Magers, Andersen Found Guilty of 
Obstruction, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 2002, http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/15062002-
112827-6571r.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).  
 20. See Fastow Charged with Enron Fraud, CNN.com, Oct. 2, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2002/BUSINESS/asia/10/02/us.fastow.biz/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (describing how 
former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow was indicted on federal charges of securities, mail, and wire fraud, 
money laundering, and conspiracy). See also Luisa Beltran, Enron: Skilling Blames Others, 
CNN.COM, Feb. 26, 2002, at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/02/26/ enron.hearing/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (observing that former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling, who has an M.B.A. 
from Harvard, claimed he was ignorant of rules prohibiting the illegal accounting practices that Enron 
accountants used); Ex-Enron Executive Pleads Guilty, CNN.COM, Aug. 22, 2002, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/08/21/enron/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (covering 
the guilty plea of former Enron executive Michael Kopper, who agreed to cooperate with the 
investigation as part of a plea-bargain deal).  
 21. Manuel A. Rodriguez, The Numbers Game: Manipulation of Financial Reporting by 
Corporations and Their Executives, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 451, 452–53 (2002) (noting that the 
FASB issues “extensive and detailed accounting standards.”).  
 22. Id. at 452. 
 23. Id. at 454–55. The FASB was created in 1973 to address “previous failed standard setting 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/8
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while the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) 
had the supervisory power to oversee the regulation of the GAAP rules.24  
However, the GAAP system was subject to many flaws, including the 
self-regulation that led to massive abuses of the system. Since the 
requirements were so stringent, accounting firms found ways to 
circumvent the rules. In a 1996 review of the accounting profession, the 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) identified five “major issues” that 
were seen as weaknesses in the self-regulatory nature of the accounting 
system including:  
1. Auditor Independence; 
2. Auditor’s Responsibilities for fraud and Internal Controls; 
3. Audit Quality; 
4. Accounting and Auditing Standard Setting Processes; and  
5. The Role of the Auditor in the Further Enhancement of Financial 
Reporting.25
Auditor independence is perhaps the most important of these concerns 
because it ensures that the auditor’s relationship with the client does not 
compromise the quality of the audit. Previous laws required accountants to 
maintain arm’s length relationships with their corporate audit clients.26 
The arm’s length requirement provides that a member of an accounting 
firm cannot audit a company in which he owns stock or serves as an 
officer.27
attempts.” Id. at 454. The Board acts as the “primary private standard setter.” Id. Funded by the 
Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), seven full-time members make up the Board. Id. The SEC 
“generally acquiesce[s]” to the GAAP standard adopted by the FASB. Id. The “principal 
pronouncement” of the FASB, releasing the GAAP standards, is known as the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards. Id. at 455. This pronouncement is “enacted only after extensive deliberation 
and regard for due process.” Id. 
 24. Id. (noting that the AICPA acts as the “national professional organization” for CPAs in the 
United States). 
 25. Id. at 457, citing United States Gen. Acct. Office, The Accounting Profession, Major Issues: 
Progress and Concerns, Sept. 1996, at 4, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004). This report was requested by Representative John Dingell of Michigan, the Chairman 
of the Committee on Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives. Id. 
 26. Tamar Frankel, Accountants’ Independence: The Recent Dilemma, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 261, 262 (2000) (noting that in practice the arm’s length requirement meant that, “[i]ndependent 
accountants must be autonomous from the corporations that they audit.”). 
 27. Id. 
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3. As the Big Five Accounting Firms Grew, They Provided Broader 
Services to Their Clients, Including Legal and Consulting Services 
As the Big Five accounting firms grew and offered more services,28 
they also compromised their independence.29 When the responsibilities of 
the accounting firms increased, additional potential conflicts of interest 
arose.30 The integration of accounting and consulting services led to a 
situation in which accounting firms audited transactions structured 
pursuant to their own consulting advice.31 As a result, in the late 1990s, 
many of the large accounting firms chose to separate their consulting 
practices from their public accounting practices in order to avoid conflicts 
of interest and government suspicions arising therefrom.32
This was not the first time the accounting industry found itself in a 
situation it could not control through self-regulation. In the late 1980s, a 
practice of “opinion shopping” developed among the Big Five accounting 
firms.33 Opinion shopping clients jumped from firm to firm in search of 
the most accommodating financial accounting standards.34 As the SEC 
became more and more concerned with the industry’s practices, the 
accounting firms began to regulate their conduct, decreasing the 
prevalence of opinion shopping.35
 28. Id. The accounting firms had always offered audit services. However, they also began to 
offer legal services, tax services, management consulting, strategic planning, information technology, 
and mergers and acquisitions advice. Id. at 263. In short, the accounting firms sought to develop 
business strategies. Id. at 263. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Ken Brown, Andersen Consulting Becomes Accenture, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2000, at B6. 
Arthur Andersen split with its consulting practice, Andersen Consulting. Id. After arbitration, 
Andersen Consulting was rebranded Accenture. Id. The consulting firm held its initial public offering 
of stock in July of 2001. Rachel Emma Silverman & Kate Kelly, Accenture IPO Goes Forward in 
Cold Climate, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2001, at C1. In order to “differentiate itself from its former parent, 
KPMG LLP,” KPMG Consulting changed its name to BearingPoint in October of 2002. Kemba J. 
Dunham, KPMG Consulting Inc Picks BearingPoint for its New Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at 
B10.  
 33. Dale R. Rietberg, Auditor Changes and Opinion Shopping—A Proposed Solution, 22 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 211, 215 (1988). 
 34. Id. at 216. 
 35. Id. at 227–28. In addition, the SEC developed regulations of their own to combat the 
problem. Id. The agency implemented several structural safeguards to “discourage opinion shopping.” 
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/8
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4. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was Quickly Enacted by Congress as a 
Legislative “Solution” to Accounting and Securities Regulatory 
Incompetence 
In light of recent scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and other 
companies, Congress did not wait for the Big Five to regulate themselves 
and, instead, introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on February 14, 2002.36 
The bill was introduced by Representative Michael Oxley of Ohio in order 
to “provid[e] enhancements necessary to support the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in its role to protect investors.”37
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act modified accounting practices in several 
significant ways. First, it established a board to oversee the accounting 
industry.38 Although the board is not an official agency of the federal 
government,39 it nevertheless regulates the accounting industry. Second, 
Titles I and II of the Act set forth modifications to the governance of the 
accounting profession,40 while Title II exclusively addresses auditing 
practices. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focuses on corporate 
accountability and fraud penalties,41 the regulations governing accounting 
firm audits may be more problematic. 
Title I establishes the oversight board42 and sets forth its powers and 
duties. These duties include: (1) the registration of all public accounting 
 36. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, Bill 
Tracking Report H.R. 3763, 107th Cong., § 2 (2002).  
 37. 148 CONG. REC. E657-E658 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley).  
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a). The board is known as the “Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board.” 
 39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(b) (“The Board shall not be an agency or 
establishment of the United States Government”). 
 40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 101-209, 15 U.S.C.A. 7211. 
 41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 101-1107. For example, Title VIII provides that all accountants 
shall maintain any records containing audit information for a period of five years. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
§ 802, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1520(a)(1). Also, the Act, provides “whistleblower protection” for the employees 
of publicly traded companies. Employees who report company violations cannot be discharged, 
demoted, suspended, threatened, or otherwise. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a). In 
addition, penalties are increased for wrongdoers in Title VIII. Under the Act, an individual who 
commits securities fraud may be punished with fines and up to twenty years in prison. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(c). The penalties for mail and wire fraud are also increased under Title 
IX. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 903, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343. Finally, Title XI provides 
that the SEC can freeze the assets of those who violate securities fraud rules. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
§ 1103(a)(3), 18 U.S.C.A. § 78u-3(a)(3).  
 42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a). This section of the Act also 
enumerates the board’s powers:  
The members of the Board shall take such action (including the hiring of staff, proposal of 
rules, and adoption of initial and transitional auditing and other professional standards) as 
may be necessary or appropriate to enable the Commission to determine, not later than 270 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, that the Board is so organized and has the 
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firms preparing audit reports; (2) the establishment of auditing standards; 
(3) the inspection of public accounting firms; (4) the investigation and 
discipline of firm violations; (5) the performance of necessary, non-
designated functions; (6) the enforcement of compliance with the Act and 
related law; and (7) the management of the board.43
Title II addresses current problems perceived to be related to auditor 
independence.44 One facet of Title II prohibits accounting firms from 
becoming the one-stop shops, commonly known as MDPs.45 The Act 
explicitly provides that it shall be unlawful for a public accounting firm 
performing auditory functions for a company to also carry out any of the 
following functions for the company: (1) bookkeeping, including services 
related to the preparation of financial statements; (2) financial information 
system services; (3) appraisal services; (4) actuarial services; (5) audit 
outsourcing services; (6) management or human resources functions; (7) 
investment banking services; (8) legal services unrelated to the audit; or 
(9) other services as the oversight board determines.46
The Act contains additional provisions designed to insure auditor 
independence. For example, the Act prohibits an audit partner in a public 
accounting firm from overseeing the audit of a company for more than five 
consecutive fiscal years.47 In addition, the Auditor Independence 
provisions require the Office of the Comptroller General to conduct a 
study of the effects of the mandatory rotation of public accounting firms.48 
If adopted, mandatory rotation would require the entire firm be rotated, 
while the current law requires only the rotation of partners within a firm.49
capacity to carry out the requirements of this title, and to enforce compliance with this title by 
registered public accounting firms and associated persons thereof. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(d).  
 43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(c).  
 44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 201-209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7231, 7232, 78j-l et seq. 
 45. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7231 (explicitly addressing “services outside the 
scope of practice of auditors.”). 
 46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l.  
 47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 203(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l. This section provides:  
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an 
issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), 
or the auditor partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for 
that issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer. 
Id. 
 48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 207(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7232(a). 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983). Firm rotation is similar to the imputed 
disqualification rule of legal ethics. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/8
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Congress believed that the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would 
be effective in preventing future disasters like Enron.50 The bill was passed 
by the House on April 24, 2002, two months after it was introduced.51 The 
Senate passed the bill on July 25, 2002.52 Under the pressure created by 
corporate scandal, the members of Congress had enacted a legislative 
quick fix to distance themselves from responsibility relating to the 
economic downturn in the United States.  
B. Before the United States Experienced the Problems of the 1990s and 
Early 2000s, Japan Faced Similar Struggles and Answered with 
Similar Legislative “Solutions” 
1. As Commercial Code Reforms Were Passed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance Over a Period of Two Decades, the Japanese 
Economy Found Itself in a Perpetual State of Decline 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) controls nearly all aspects 
of finance in Japan. It regulates the securities markets, the accounting 
standards, and taxation accounting practices.53 For accounting 
 50. Representative Oxley introduced the bill by claiming that the “enhancements [were] 
necessary to support the Securities and Exchange Commission in its role to protect investors of public 
companies[.]” See supra note 37. 
 51. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, Bill 
Tracking Report H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Bill Gordon, A Critical Evaluation of Japanese Accounting Changes Since 1997 (1999) 
(unpublished M.A.A.J.S. dissertation), http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/jaaccont.htm (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004). The Japanese operate within a “triangular legal system.” Id. at 2. “There are 
three laws which prescribe financial accounting and reporting in Japan; the Commercial Code, 
Securities and Exchange Law, and Corporate Income Tax Law.” Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Accounting and Disclosure System in Japan, at http://jicpa.or.jp/n_eng/e-account.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (describing the integration of the legal system in Japan). Regarding the 
individual laws, the Institute states: 
The Commercial Code requires a joint-stock corporation . . . to prepare an annual report 
basically on an individual basis. The annual report submitted to the general meeting of 
shareholders has to include the balance sheet, the income statement, the business report, the 
profit appropriation/loss disposition proposal, and supporting schedules. The Code also 
requires certain “large corporations” (as defined by the Code) to include designated 
consolidated financial statements . . . in the reports of the business years ending in or after 
April 2004. 
Under the Securities and Exchange Law, each “issuer” of designated securities is required to 
file annual and semi-annual reports with the Prime Minister and copies of those with the stock 
exchange(s) where its securities are listed. The financial statements prepared for the purpose 
of securities registration and periodic reporting under the law have to include the balance 
sheet, the income statement, the statement of profit appropriation/loss disposal, supporting 
schedules thereto; the consolidated income statement, the consolidated statement of retained 
earnings, the consolidated statement of cash flows, and supporting schedules thereto. 
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standardization and regulation, the MOF works mainly through the 
Business Accounting Council (“BAC”), an entity much like the SEC’s 
FASB.54 In response to the manipulation of profits through subsidiaries by 
several corporations,55 the MOF instituted Commercial Code Reforms in 
1974.56 These reforms first introduced an independent audit requirement in 
The financial statements prepared under the Commercial Code and the Securities and 
Exchange Law are, for the most part, compatible with each other. 
The Corporate Income Tax Law provides methods for calculating taxable income and 
requires that revenues and expenses be recorded in the books of account in order to be 
qualified under the Law. This requirement sometimes affects enterprise accounting in Japan. 
Id.  
 54. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 6. The Council was originally established in 1948 and became 
the BADC in 1952, after a series of name and structure changes. Id. The BADC has undergone a 
recent name change and is now known as the Business Accounting Council (“BAC”). The JICPA 
states: 
Business Accounting Principles issued by the Business Accounting Council (BAC), 
Accounting Standards issued by the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ), and 
Practical Guidelines issued by the JICPA are deemed to be the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) in Japan . . . The standard setters have been successful in narrowing the 
gap between Japanese standards and International Accounting Standards in recent years. The 
financial statements according to the regulations . . . contain few differences with IAS or 
USGAAP. 
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting and Disclosure System in Japan, supra 
note 53. The BAC is responsible for all three laws of the Triangular Legal System. “The Auditing 
Standards codified by the BAC together with audit guidelines issued by the JICPA are deemed to be 
the generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).” Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Auditing System in Japan, at http://www.jicpa.or.jp/n_engle-audit.html (last visited Apr. 
16, 2004). The GAAS provide guidance for statutory and non-statutory audits under the Commercial 
Code, Securities and Exchange Law, and other related laws. Id.  
 55. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 8. Because subsidiaries were not subject to CPA firms’ audits, 
the parent companies could use subsidiaries to “disguise losses” or “inflate profits.” Id. Gordon notes: 
Before 1974, the CC did not require company financial statements to be audited by a CPA 
firm. Although the SEL [Securities and Exchange Law] required audits of parent-only 
financial statements for listed companies, the subsidiaries and affiliates generally did not have 
audits since they were not listed on a stock exchange. The CC and SEL require that a 
corporation’s statutory auditors examine the financial statements to ensure fraud does not take 
place and that directors have complied with the law and articles of incorporation. The 
statutory auditors, with their qualifications not clearly defined in the law, sometimes had no 
independence or lacked sufficient knowledge of accounting and auditing, which resulted in 
several cases in the 1960s of financial statement window-dressing not being detected or 
reported. Even for the companies that had audits by independent CPAs under the provisions 
of the SEL, the CPAs for several of the companies that went bankrupt failed to disclose to the 
MOF, through their audit reports, financial statement window-dressing used by the companies 
to manipulate profits and disguise their true financial position. 
Id. Some have compared the Japanese era where “big companies went bankrupt revealing their 
fraudulent accounting” to the United States’s recent corporate scandals. Zenichi Shishido, Reform in 
Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 666 (2001). 
 56. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 8. The reforms applied to companies with capital greater than 
500 million yen or liabilities greater than 20 billion yen. Id. The reforms required that an auditor be 
either a CPA or an “auditing corporation of CPAs.” Id. Perhaps these auditors’ ineffectiveness can be 
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Japan.57 The MOF intended the independent audits to expand the auditor’s 
function beyond accounting to include monitoring illegality.58 In 1981, the 
MOF felt that the Commercial Code governing Japanese companies 
needed further reform. The MOF instituted new reforms, including the 
creation of additional auditing standards that required companies “to have 
more than two auditors, one of which was full-time.”59  
These reforms were widely criticized, largely due to the ineffectiveness 
of auditor monitoring.60 Ineffective monitoring led to questionable 
accounting practices, which inflated financial data and created an 
economic boom in Japan during the 1980s.61 During this time, the Nikkei 
Dow almost tripled.62 However, the bubble eventually burst and the 
Japanese economy slipped into a lengthy recession.63
2. Japan Implemented a Significant Series of Reforms in the Mid-
1990s Known as the “Japanese Big Bang” 
Thus, in the early 1990s, the Japanese MOF once again found itself in a 
position where it needed to make auditing reforms. The MOF identified 
three areas in need of reform: (1) the “business and regulatory 
environment”; (2) the “loopholes and weaknesses in the accounting rules”; 
linked to their lack of education and experience. In Japan, the procedure for becoming a CPA is a 
simple, three-stage process. Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Becoming a CPA in 
Japan, at http://www.jicpa.or.jp./n_eng/e-cpaexam.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). The first stage has 
“no educational requirements.” In fact, this stage simply ensures that a potential candidate has “general 
literacy” skills. Id. A candidate with at least two years of college education does not even have to sit 
for this stage. Id. Candidates who passed the first stage are eligible for the second stage. Id. This stage 
includes multiple choice tests, which are a prerequisite to an essay exam covering basic accounting 
principles, the commercial code, and other topics. Id. Candidates for the third stage must merely 
complete a two-year training course (much like an associate’s degree program in the United States) 
and then pass written and oral examinations. Id.  
 57. Gordon, supra note 53, at 9. These measures were intended to “improve the quality of CPA 
audits” and “strengthen the financial reporting of companies.” Id.  
 58. Shishido, supra note 55, at 666. This restored a previously possessed power to the auditors. 
Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. At the time of the reforms, the legislature was looking for a quick response to recent 
scandals involving large companies. Id. The legislature implemented the reforms because they were 
acceptable to the companies’ executives. Id. 
 61. Id. at 668. 
 62. Id. “Japanese management enjoyed free cash flow for the first time in history and they 
wasted it. Japanese corporate governance was good at encouraging the growth of the company but had 
never experienced the need to monitor for efficient use of free cash flow.” Id. 
 63. Id. The recession created a need for a change in the corporate governance system, which 
came about in the 1990s. Id. The following changes occurred during the Japanese transition: (1) shift 
from loan financing to equity financing via bonds; (2) significantly decreased rates of return to 
shareholders; and (3) elimination of lifetime employment. Id. at 669–71.  
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(3) and the “weak auditing practices” of the Japanese accounting system.64 
In response, the Prime Minister ordered the BADC to bring Japanese 
accounting in line with international standards.65 The BADC’s response 
became known as the “Japanese Accounting Big Bang.”  
The goal of this plan was to make the Japanese markets “free, fair, and 
global.”66 In effect, the plan was to deregulate several elements of the 
business markets in Japan.67 Just like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Big 
Bang affected both securities and accounting regulations.68 The intended 
effect of the reforms was to make the Japanese marketplace more like that 
of the United States.69 The plan was to “promote competition by lowering, 
or even eliminating, the barriers separating different sectors of the 
financial industry.”70  
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. The Japanese System of Regulation Has Not Performed as Well as 
Those Who Proposed the Reforms Thought As It Resulted in a Lack of 
Auditor Independence 
The “Big Bang” reforms have not had a positive impact on the 
Japanese economy. The Nikkei 225 Stock Index, also known as the Nikkei 
 64. Gordon, supra note 53, at 36. “The BADC pointed out the need for reform of Japan’s 
financial reporting system in order to enable investors to make better informed decisions based on 
more accurate representation of a company’s financial condition and operating results.” Id. 
 65. Id. Explicit objectives of the system were “promoting the participation of foreign and 
domestic investors in Japan’s securities markets and [establishing] a disclosure system on par with 
international standards and based on consolidated financial statements.” Id. In fact, many organizations 
in addition to the government indicated an interest in keeping Japan in line with other international 
accounting organizations. The JICPA is a founding member of the International Federation of 
Accountants (“IFAC”), the International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”), and the 
Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (“CAPA”). The JICPA also retains a leadership role 
in many of these organizations. Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Contribution to 
International Organizations, at http://www.jicpa.or/jp/n_eng/e-cpa.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 66. Sheryl WuDunn, Japan Announces New Plan to Deregulate Financial Markets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1996, at D9.  
 67. Id. “[T]he government intended to ease nearly all major regulations” including “the tax, 
accounting and legal systems.” Id. “The plain conclusion is that Japan’s rigid regulation of its domestic 
financial markets made it uncompetitive with the world’s other major financial centers and created 
financial institutions that depend more on official protection than the ability to succeed amidst free 
competition.” Jessica J. Wiley, Will the “Bang” Mean “Big” Changes to Japanese Financial Laws, 22 
HAMLINE INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 386 (1999).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Ernest T. Patrikis, Japan’s Big Bang Financial Reforms, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 577, 577 
(1998). “Once the Big Bang reforms are fully implemented, Japan’s cloistered financial system may 
come to resemble the open, competitive system [in] the United States.” Id.  
 70. Id. at 584. 
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Dow, was at 22,041 in April of 1996 before the reforms were announced; 
by August of 2002, the index was down to 9,619.30.71 This economic 
downturn may have been caused by the exceptions the MOF made to its 
new reform rules, demonstrating its reluctance to change.72 The downturn 
could also have been due to differences between Japanese accounting 
standards and international standards.73 However, it is more likely that the 
downturn was caused by the government’s continued control of the 
accounting industry in Japan.74 In summary, “[t]he current process of 
having MOF dictate the issues on the agenda to the BADC does not allow 
for an independent, comprehensive, and proactive examination of 
accounting issues that will remain after implementation of the changes 
announced since.”75
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Did Little to Change the Disastrous Situation 
in the United States Because the Regulations Failed to Address the 
Correct Issues 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects many of the same weaknesses found 
in Japan’s Big Bang Reforms, although its effect is not yet as evident.76 
 71. Japan Nikkei 225 Stock Index Monthly Values, at http://www.forecasts.org/data/data/ 
nik225M.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
 72. Gordon, supra note 53, at 47 (pointing out, “[t]he government continues to manipulate 
financial reporting rules for political purposes.”). Gordon, supra note 53.  
 73. Id. at 48–50. Gordon pointed out several key differences. These were: 
(1) the fact that the Japanese accounting standards lacked a recognition element for a capital 
loss on a long-term asset; 
(2) the relevance of the inventory valuation method. While international systems use a 
valuation method of lower-of-cost-or-market, the Japanese accounting standards allow a 
company to value inventory by whatever method it chooses; and 
(3) the lack of a standard to recognize a change in a company’s internal accounting methods.  
Id. 
 74. Id. at 50. There is still doubt whether “CPAs will perform objective, thorough audits and will 
challenge company management on questionable accounting treatments.” Id. 
 75. Id. at 52. 
 76. Although the implementation of the Act has not had direct effects on the accounting industry 
yet, the federal government is already in chaos. First, Harvey Pitt, the chairman of the SEC, resigned 
on November 5, 2002 after the SEC failed to effectively carry out the important task of appointing 
members to the oversight board created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. David S. Hilzenrath & Mike 
Allen, Besieged Pitt Quits as SEC Chairman, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at A01. Following Pitt’s 
resignation, the SEC’s head accountant, Robert K. Herdman, resigned as well for his role in the 
appointment of William Webster as Head of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
Kathleen Day, SEC’s Head Accountant Resigns, Role in Audit-Board Choice Spurred Herdman’s 
Move, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2002, at E01. Then, on November 12, 2002, William Webster resigned as 
head of the oversight board. Stephen Labaton, Webster Resigns as Head of Board to Oversee Audits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at A1; see also Webster Resignation; SEC Gets a Chance to Recover 
From Chaos, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 14, 2002, at 26A. Although Webster was a former judge, 
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There are provisions which can be readily criticized. How is the new 
oversight board different from the previously existing FASB? How is the 
new board going to be as effective as legislators hope? Can government 
regulation fix the problems created by ineffective accounting standards? 
First, according to the language of the act, the five members of the 
oversight board shall “be appointed from among prominent individuals of 
integrity and reputation.”77 This is a very weak and subjective standard 
that places the decision in the hands of those who may not be able to 
provide unbiased, independent judgment. Until recently, legislators 
certainly would have trusted corporate executives of highly successful 
companies, such as Andrew Fastow78 and Jeffrey Skilling.79  
Second, the provisions of Title I limit the number of members of the 
oversight board who can be CPAs.80 Would the legislators rather have as 
board members corporate executives who merely have a finance 
background? Should the members of the board not be those who 
understand the principles of accounting? CPAs understand the principles 
of accounting and can analyze the policy behind these standards better 
than others. Why limit the number of CPAs on the board?  
Third, how are the functions of the board different from the functions 
of the former FASB? The accounting oversight board has the 
responsibility of developing audit, quality control, and ethics standards.81 
director of the FBI, and director of the CIA, he also had been the head of the audit committee at U.S. 
Technologies, a company that had been accused of fraud. Id.  
 77. Sarbannes-Oxley Act, § 101(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(1). The requirements state that the 
members should be individuals:  
who have a demonstrated commitment to the interest of investors and the public, and an 
understanding of the responsibilities for and nature of the financial disclosures required of 
issuers under the securities laws and the obligations of accountants with respect to the 
preparation and issuance of audit reports with respect to such disclosure. 
Id.  
 78. See Fastow, supra note 20 (reporting how Andrew Fastow, former Enron CFO, is suspected 
to be the “mastermind” behind the Enron mess). 
 79. See Beltran, supra note 20 (citing the fact that Skilling would admit no fault of his own in 
relation to the Enron debacle, but instead pointed fingers at others).  
 80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(2). The statute provides:  
Two members, and only 2 members, of the Board shall be or have been certified public 
accountants pursuant to the laws of 1 or more States, provided that, if 1 of those 2 members is 
the chairperson, he or she may not have been a practicing certified public accountant for at 
least 5 years prior to his or her appointment to the Board. 
Id. 
 81. The Act provides: 
The Board shall, by rule, establish, including, to the extent it determines appropriate, through 
adoption of standards proposed by 1 or more professional groups of accountants, amend or 
otherwise modify or alter, such auditing and related attestation standards, such quality control 
standards, and such ethics standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the 
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As previously noted, the FASB was responsible for the creation, 
implementation, and enforcement of these same standards,82 leading to the 
conclusion that this is just a further regulation of the rule-making and 
enforcement body.  
Title II’s provisions create further problems. In order to address auditor 
independence, the provisions prohibit accounting firms from offering any 
services other than auditing and tax accounting.83 The firms are not 
allowed to provide consulting, legal, or other services that the oversight 
board deems inappropriate.84 This prohibition, in effect, prohibits MDPs.85 
Why would the government want to forbid these practices when, in fact, a 
major cause of the Enron debacle was that the right hand did not know 
what the left hand was doing?86  
C. Both the American and Japanese Reforms Fail to Address Necessary 
Issues; Both Systems Get Lost in a Mess of Regulation and 
Deregulation  
In comparing the two countries’ reforms, it is easy to identify the many 
similarities between the Japanese Big Bang reforms and the American 
reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Both utilize a board to oversee the 
creation, implementation, and enforcement of accounting standards. The 
Japanese BAC and the American Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board are controlled by their respective federal government. The BAC is 
controlled by the MOF and the Oversight Board is an indirect extension of 
the SEC.87 However, the fact that the accounting industries are controlled 
preparation and issuance of audit reports . . .  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i).  
 82. See supra note 23.  
 83. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (listing activities that accounting firms are 
prohibited from performing).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Rodriguez, supra note 21. Rodriguez notes: 
[r]ecently, the SEC has aggressively encroached on traditional accounting enforcement and 
self-regulatory schemes in slowing the growth of the multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) and 
significantly strengthening auditor independence rules. This flawed oversight of the financial 
reporting and regulatory model in the United States has helped usher in a period of standards 
overload and increased investor confusion over the comparability and credibility of financial 
statements[.] 
Id. 
 86. Naftali Bendavid, Enron’s Law Firm Begins to Draw Fire, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2002, at 17 
(noting that Vinson & Elkins, Enron’s law firm, seemed to not know that Arthur Andersen accountants 
were structuring these illegal accounting transactions). 
 87. The Oversight Board is an indirect extension of the SEC. The Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board is not explicitly a governmental organization according to the words of the Sarbanes-
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by governmental entities merely exacerbates the central problem—that 
federal governments turn to regulation as a solution.  
Essentially, both the Japanese and American reforms are a confusing 
web of regulation and deregulation. The auditing standards get lost in the 
system. In a mass of legislation, it becomes difficult to interpret which 
reforms are applicable at any given time. The regulation, deregulation, re-
regulation, and re-deregulation can be analogized to the recently-adopted 
airport security system in the United States. Many have criticized the 
regulation of the airport security system because it federalizes the pre-
existing services, when it is widely recognized that competition in industry 
usually results in higher quality.88 The solutions of both the United States 
government and the Japanese government do not solve the problems that 
their legislation was designed to address.89
These governments should refrain from falling into their old traps. 
Each time a problem has surfaced within the accounting industry, there 
has been a default response of regulative control from legislatures. In 
contrast, more innovative and progressive solutions are needed. By 
consulting with members of the industry and taking time to develop 
effective solutions, accounting scandals can be avoided in the future. 
D. A Proposed Alternative Solution in Response to Accounting 
Controversies: Encouraging MDPs  
Although both the Japanese and American systems have weaknesses, 
the American system fails to an even greater degree. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act sets a goal of eliminating MDPs,90 when in reality these practices are 
Oxley Act. The Act states that, “[t]he Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United 
States Government” and “[n]o member of person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall be 
deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such 
service.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(b). However, many provisions in the Act 
refer to powers conferred under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
§ 2(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7210(a)(b). 
 88. See, e.g., Daniel John Sobieski, Best Airport Security Includes Private Companies, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 13, 2001, at 18.  
 89. Shishido, supra note 55, at 676. “The actual effect of legal reform on the practice depends on 
the coordination of practical demands, which is the creature of the background economic market and 
social norms.” Id.  
 90. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l(g). These provisions have caused one 
commentator to note: 
After a phase-in period, public companies will be prohibited from using their auditors for 
designated non-audit services, and other services will require audit committee approval and 
public disclosure. Non-audit services are broadly and ambiguously defined as any 
professional services other than in connection with an audit or review of financial statements, 
and specifically include tax services, bookkeeping, systems design and implementation, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/8
p937 Morrison.doc 7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE JAPANESE ACCOUNTING BIG BANG 953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the solution to each country’s predicaments.91 Instead of regulation and 
deregulation, a self-help measure of integration is the solution. A 
multidisciplinary practice integrating auditing services, tax services, and 
legal services would result in the kind of accountability and integrity both 
sets of reforms were intended to accomplish. “This proposed solution 
takes into account the interests of the members of the legal and accounting 
professions and the clients they serve.”92
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) defines an MDP as: 
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity 
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of 
its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client other than the 
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing non-
legal, as well as legal, services[.]93
MDPs include an arrangement by which a law firm joins with other 
professional firms to provide services with direct or indirect sharing of 
profits as part of the arrangement.94 Currently in the United States, MDPs 
appraisals, actuarial services, management or human resources services, investment banking, 
or legal or expert services unrelated to the audit. 
Brian P. Kane, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Something for Everyone to Worry About, 45-OCT 
ADVOC. (IDAHO) 16, 17 (2002).  
 91. There are many factors causing the push towards MDPs: 
1. Globalization 
2. Consumers 
3. The Big Five Accounting Firms 
4. Banks  
5. Other Financial Institutions 
Bourland, infra note 93, at 531 (listing the factors causing the “MDP Initiative”).  
 92. Jon Coffin, Multidisciplinary Practices: A Proposed Solution to Effectuate the Inevitable, 3 
Transactions, TENN. J. BUS. L. 35, 35 (2002).  
 93. See supra note 90. See also Haddon, infra note 110, at 395. The Commission went on to say 
that an MDP “includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other professional 
firms to provide services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.” 
Michael Bourland & W. Marc. McDonald, Multidisciplinary Practice: Challenges and 
Opportunities—Alternative Models and Client Service Opportunities, SG020 ALI-ABA 523, 530 
(2001). Although MDPs with accounting services are not permitted, under legal ethics rules, there are 
some multidisciplinary practices which are permitted:  
A. An organization fully or partly owned by non-lawyers in which lawyers are engaged in 
the provision of legal services to clients for fees. 
B. Independent law firms working in close cooperation with non-lawyer owned businesses, 
usually under management services contracts. 
C. The Commission recognized that MDPs could include lawyers working with social 
workers, medical personnel, psychologists, and other professionals. 
Phoebe A. Haddon, Multidisciplinary Practice: Recent Developments and Effects of the Continuing 
Debate, SF58 ALI-ABA 373, 375 (2001).  
 94. ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES, MDP FINAL REPORT APP. A, at 
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are not lawful.95 Accountants would like to see the practice legalized so 
that their firms can offer full-scale services.96 In contrast, the ABA and 
most lawyers oppose the legalization of MDPs;97 however, the ABA holds 
this position without reference to the findings of its commission appointed 
to investigate MDPs.98 Although hesitant to implement the practices, even 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 95. Coffin, supra note 92, at 36. “The pure form of the MDP is not currently sanctioned in the 
United States. Specifically, legal rules of professional conduct prohibit the unauthorized practice of 
law and prevent fee-sharing between licensed attorneys and non-lawyers.” Id.  
 96. Id. at 38 (noting that a survey of 1,000 AICPA members “demonstrated that accounting firms 
already provide legal services in the United States and desire to provide additional services if MDPs 
are allowed.”).  
 97. The ABA holds many concerns about “accounting firms’ incursion into the legal market.” Id. 
at 37. If the ABA took the time to look at the situation objectively, it would recognize that more legal 
jobs would be created if accounting firms were allowed to provide legal services. “MDPs can achieve 
for traditional law firms the results that occurred when accounting firms developed into professional 
services firms.” Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary Practices: Are They Already Among Us, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 639, 651 (2002). 
 98. Hadden, supra note 93, at 375. “President Phil Anderson appointed a Commission to 
determine whether changes in the Model Rules to permit lawyers to share fees with non-lawyers were 
in the public’s interest.” Id. The Commission concluded, after a year of research, that “it was in the 
public interest to relax the rules.” Id. at 375. In 1999, when the Commission recommended that 
“MDPs (including ‘fully integrated’ MDPs) be permitted, subject to special regulations,” the ABA 
House of Delegates rejected the proposal. Id. The Commission, a year later, proposed another solution 
which “permitted [lawyers] to share fees provided that the lawyers have the control and authority 
necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services.” Id. at 376. See also 
Bourland, supra note 93, at 529–30; Stuart S. Prince, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA’s Misguided 
Quash of the MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2000).  
 In addition to the different solutions proposed by the Commission, there are many varieties of 
MDP alternative implementations: (1) the “Loose Alliance Model,” which allows for a “lawyer to 
form a loose alliance with the nonlawyers.”; (2) the “Captive Law Firm Model,” in which a law firm 
practices on the premises of an accounting firm, while having no ownership or managerial interest in 
the new law firm; and (3) the “Highly-Integrated MDP Model,” which would involve a law firm 
operating as a fully-integrated division of an accounting firm. Charles W. Wolfram, Comparative 
Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law: Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. RES. 961, 966–69 
(2002). These models are often referred to, respectively, as the “Contract or Association Model”, the 
“Washington, D.C. Model”, and the “Fully Integrated Model”. See Breakley, infra note 104, at 279–
83. See also Prince at 262–65 (describing five practice models including “(1) the Cooperative Model, 
(2) the Command and Control Model, (3) the Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business Model, (4) the 
Contract Model, and (5) the Fully Integrated Model.”).  
 Among the “barriers to the MDPs” are the legal ethics rules, particularly Rules 5.4, 1.6, and 1.0 of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bourland supra note 87, at 531. Rule 5.4 prohibits 
“fee sharing with non-lawyers.” Id. Rule 1.6 provides for “confidentiality of information.” Id. Finally, 
Rule 1.10 is the “imputed disqualification rule.” Id. The comments following Rule 5.4 provide that:  
the provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations 
are to protect the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than 
the client pays the lawyer’s fees or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that 
arrangement does not modify the lawyer’s obligation to the client. [S]uch arrangements 
should not interfere with the lawyer’s professional judgment. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (Discussion Draft 1999). This comment demonstrates that 
the ABA’s real concern is about the lawyer’s judgment. However, adding an accountant to the 
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the legal profession has recognized that MDPs are effective as a tool for 
businesses.99
It is not surprising that many of the lawmakers who formulated the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which outlaws MDPs, are themselves attorneys. 
Thus, the question becomes whether attorneys are trying to give the best 
representation and services to their clients, or whether these professionals 
are concerned with setting up potential defenses for themselves if 
accounting scandals give rise to legal issues. Consider the Enron situation, 
where Vinson & Elkins, the former corporation’s law firm, escaped 
responsibility for any wrongdoing.100 Meanwhile, Arthur Andersen, the oil 
giant’s accounting firm, faced many charges.101  
If the situation were different, and all of the services were integrated, 
many people would know about the transactions and could confer about 
their potential illegality in order to avoid wrongdoing.102 While the 
provisions of the Act include requirements for lawyers to report any 
violations of SEC regulations they discover, the Act also outlaws 
MDPs.103 It is evident that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can never accomplish 
decision-making process will not impede the attorney’s judgment; rather it will further the client’s best 
interests. In fact, this provision has been widely criticized because it “establishes a flat ban where less 
drastic means would suffice” and “constitutes a barrier to competition in the delivery of legal 
services.” Id.  
 99. See supra note 98. See also Haddon, infra note 111, at 396 (recognizing that “the ABA 
House of Delegates recommended that every state revisit and revise rules governing relationships 
between lawyers and nonlegal professionals.”). See generally Susan B. Schwab, Bringing Down the 
Bar: Accountants Challenge Meaning of Unauthorized Practice, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1425 (2000). 
 100. Mark Curriden, Enron Casts Pall Over Legal Firm; But Vinson & Elkins Doesn’t Appear to 
Have Done Wrong, Experts Say, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 30, 2002, at 1D. “The good news 
for [Vinson & Elkins] is that there’s no evidence so far that it violated any laws or did anything 
improper, some legal ethicists say.” Id. In the view of some legal ethicists, Vinson & Elkins was not 
liable for any violations. “‘In my view, the criticism of V&E has been unfairly harsh,’ said Stephen 
Gillers, a legal ethics expert at New York University, ‘because there is no evidence the firm violated 
ethics rules.’” Bendavid, supra note 86, at 17. In addition, the firm defended its own conduct. “Vinson 
& Elkins spokesman defended the law firm’s work yesterday, saying it should not be held responsible 
for failing to uncover complex accounting problems that Wall Street analysts and others repeatedly 
missed.” Carrie Johnson, House Panel to Question Enron’s Attorneys, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at 
E01.  
 101. The SEC filed charges against Andersen partners, alleging they “signed off on fraudulent 
accounting practices.” Phil McCarty, SEC Alleges Andersen Partner Approved Fraudulent 
Accounting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2002, at C12. In June, a federal jury convicted Arthur Andersen 
LLP of criminal obstruction of justice in connection with investigation of its Enron Corp audits. 
Jonathan Weil, Andersen Win Lifts US Enron Case, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at A1. Andersen was 
subjected to a $500,000 fine and a 5-year probation period following its conviction on obstruction of 
justice charges. Andersen Sentenced to 5 Years Probation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at C3.  
 102. MDPs are a way “to improve the perception of the legal profession” and the accounting 
profession. Yarbrough, supra note 97, at 649. 
 103. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l. Regarding this provision, one commentator 
has stated: 
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its intended goals without the integration of the legal and accounting 
duties within corporations.104  
Having access to the knowledge of each profession will help the firms 
better serve their clients. Accountants bring accounting expertise to the 
table and lawyers meld that knowledge with accepted legal theories.105 
This is especially true for tax practitioners.106 Attorneys need to 
understand complex accounting theory and accountants need to understand 
the law as it relates to their field of practice.107
By January 26, 2003, the SEC must issue final rules setting forth minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC in the 
representation of issuers. Included within this rule, must be provisions requiring attorneys to 
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation to the CEO or Chief Legal Counsel, and absent appropriate response, report the 
same to the issuer’s audit committee. It appears that this reporting requirement will apply to 
both in-house and outside legal counsel. Attorneys will not be required to report violations to 
the SEC or any other third party. A related provision seems to strike at the heart of 
multidisciplinary practice. 
Kane, supra note 71, at 17. 
 104. Yarbrough, supra note 97, at 648. “[T]he public will be best served by utilizing the combined 
skills of both professions” in order to “offer clients competent, effective, and cost-effective one stop 
solutions to global business problems,” solutions that are within the limits of the law. Id. One author 
has analyzed the efficiency, expertise, and cost-effectiveness offered by such practices. In terms of 
efficiency, “[t]here has been an increasing demand for ‘one-stop shopping.’ This trend can be seen not 
only in the accounting and consulting fields, but also in the legal services field.” Tia Breakley, 
Multidisciplinary Practices: Lawyers & Accountants Under One Roof?, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
275, 298 (2000) (quoting Irwin L. Trieger & William J. Lipton, Written Remarks to the ABA 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 11, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
trieger1.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2003)). Further, “[t]he Big Five are clearly well-positioned to offer 
clients a wide array of services from management consulting to tax planning.” Id. The accounting 
firms can also offer needed expertise. Id. “[A]ccounting firms have already begun to recruit attorneys 
directly from top law schools and have been successful in luring associates from many of the country’s 
top law firms.” Id. at 299. In terms of cost-effectiveness, “most significant cost savings to the client 
would come from the sharing of resources.” Id. “[The firms] have a client base that already uses those 
services and a wealth of individuals within their ranks who have the expertise to provide the services. 
From a human resources standpoint, these firms could implement a virtually seamless expansion of 
services.” Id. at 300. 
 105. Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating Legally-Aware Accountants, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 
597, 617–18 (2001).  
 106. Id. at 618. Prentice observes: 
Tax practice is law, and rather complex and confusing law at that. There can be no doubt that 
knowledge of important legal concepts, such as rules of statutory construction and the role of 
precedent in our court system are vital matters for all tax professionals to know. Inaccurate 
legal research is often the basis for accountant malpractice liability. Indeed, given the 
intertwining of accountants’ tax work and law, accountants also must know enough law to 
avoid illicitly engaging in its practice. 
Id.  
 107. Id. at 616. “A basic understanding of business law is essential to the auditor in his task of 
categorizing transactions for accounting purposes.” Id. (quoting Harris J. Amhowitz, The Accounting 
Professor and the Law: The Misunderstood Victim, J. ACCT., May 1987, at 356). “The point is that the 
CPA must have sufficient knowledge of various areas of law in order to perform the audit. Adequate 
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MDPs would also reduce costs for the consumer.108 Researchers have 
found that MDPs would cause reduced consumption-related and reduced 
production-related costs for the average consumer.109 This further 
exemplifies why integration is the best solution for providing the best 
service to clients,110 and why many have referred to MDPs as the wave of 
the future.111
understanding is necessary both to recognize the legal problem and to realize that some help is 
probably needed.” Id. at 617. 
 108. Micheal Trebilcock and Lilla Csorgo, Multi-Disciplinary Professional Practices: A 
Consumer Welfare Perspective, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/canada.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 109. The consumption-related cost-savings stem from the fact that the firm is “able to offer a 
number of services and specialists in one location.” Id. at 6. The different types of consumption-related 
costs are search costs, contracting costs, and coordination costs. Id. at 7–8. “[A] consumer may wish to 
reduce search costs by engaging an MDP that is able to provide all these services in many or all 
geographic locations. The MDP could offer such a consumer the additional benefit of a signal of 
quality.” Id. at 8.  
If a consumer chooses to complete the merger process using the services of a variety of 
professional firms, she will have to contract with each one . . . . If an MDP were to be 
available, the consumer may choose not to incur costs of contracting with a large number of 
firms and only choose to contract with one. 
Id. There are also coordination costs to consider.  
Once having entered into . . . contracts with separate firms to perform various parts of the 
merger process, the consumer must coordinate these tasks . . . . If an MDP were available to a 
consumer, the consumer would be able to weigh the benefits of these reduced transaction 
costs against the cost she may incur from conducting the transaction through an MDP. 
Id. at 9. Reduced production-related costs are the product of “moving a function in-house . . . rather 
than purchasing it . . . on the open market or leaving it to his customer to purchase elsewhere[.]” Id.  
 The benefits associated with “the technology of production” are classified as economies of scale 
and economies of scope. Id. “Economies of scope arise when the total cost of producing a group of 
products or services is less when these products are produced by a single firm than when the same 
volume of those products or services are produced by a set of independent firms.” Id. at 10. 
“Economies of scale arise when the average cost of producing a good decreases with increased 
production of the good.” Id.  
 110. Some have defined the ways in which MDPs will be in the client’s interest: (1) the client’s 
needs do not need to be “narrowly defined as legal”; (2) the client benefits from a “collaboration in 
problem solving”; (3) there are “savings in resources (one-stop shopping)”; (4) serving clients who are 
“[dissatisfied] with traditional model of lawyering”; (5) serving the “special needs of some clients with 
health issues” who “may be better served by [a] team approach”; and (6) greater “client 
autonomy/choice.” Phoebe Haddon, Some Ethical Considerations of Emerging Forms of Practice: 
Multidisciplinary Practice and Multijurisdictional Practice, SG095 ALI-ABA 393, 398 (2002). The 
article went on to define several ways in which attorneys will benefit, including: (1) Creation of “new 
opportunities to form creative relationships with other professionals such as doctors, nurses, 
psychologists, and social workers”; (2) “Recognition that client problems are not strictly legal”; (3) 
Creation of a means to address “client intimidation”; (4) Revision of the “definition of the practice of 
law (e.g. non-adversarial approaches to controversies)”; and (5) Elimination of the “barriers on fee-
sharing and practice with other professionals at odds with recognized practice models.” Id. The article 
also discussed benefits to other service professionals and law students. Id.  
 111. Diane L. Karpman, Multidisciplinary Practice: ‘Rampant’ Conflicts in a New Economy, 669 
PLI/LIT 345, 347 (2000). These “partnerships, strategic alliances, and entrepreneurial unions between 
lawyers and other professionals, giv[e] clients ‘one-stop shopping’.” Id.  
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MDPs are essentially already in place in the United States, with many 
lawyers working at public accounting firms.112 The large accounting firms 
seem to be more progressive than Congress or the legal industry in this 
respect. The Big Five firms consider tax accounting to be a reasonable 
measure for financial statements. In integrating these services, there is less 
of a likelihood that questionable accounting practices could be utilized in 
financial reporting. The measure of profits for tax accounting purposes 
creates a reasonable benchmark for comparison to the financial 
accounting.  
Not only are the Big Five ahead of U.S. lawmakers, but other countries 
seem to be as well. MDPs have been springing up throughout the world.113 
In Europe, Canada, and Australia, lawyers are not prohibited from 
working alongside CPAs.114 In fact, in other countries, “the Big Five are 
dominating the legal market.”115 “The effect is that the international 
accounting firms are providing legal services, including litigation, in ways 
that are fundamentally indistinct from law firms.”116  
 112. Coffin, supra note 92, at 40 (observing that CPA firms are the largest employers of attorneys 
in the United States). See also Tanina Rostain, Pockets of Professionalism, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 
1482 (2002) (reporting that many tax partners have left law firms to practice with Big Five firms); 
Yarbrough, supra note 97, at 659 (observing that many lawyers work in accounting firms to provide 
tax services). Also, BDO Seidman, another large firm that provides accounting as well as other 
professional services, heads a network of law firms and other professional firms around the globe. See 
Univer, supra note 93, at 465. BDO lists the “benefits to their member firms” as: 
(1) Resource Sharing; (2) Access to Member Expertise; (3) Access to BDO Resources; (4) 
Access to BDO Affiliations; (5) Increased Profitability; (6) Structure and Organization; and 
(7) Conflict Avoidance through Independence. 
Id. at 465–66. These member benefits assist in areas of tax, auditing, and consulting. Id.  
 113. See Prince, supra note 98, at 266 (noting that a different MDPs model has developed in 
Canada and that Swiss rules allow for fully integrated MDPs).  
 114. Micheal W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant Multidisciplinary 
Practice on the Protection of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 39 (2001). 
The nineties saw the Big Five grow into some of the largest providers of legal services in 
several European countries . . . . [T]he legal work of the Big Five in Europe now includes not 
only tax work but also work on commercial agreements, mergers and acquisitions, business 
restructurings, corporate law, intellectual property law, and finance issues. 
Id. “PricewaterhouseCoopers employs 1,600 attorneys in 42 countries around the world and Arthur 
Andersen acquired a law firm in Australia.” Coffin, supra note 92, at 40. 
 115. Yarbrough, supra note 97, at 659. Yarbrough notes:  
Currently, only Switzerland allows a fully integrated MDP, but Germany, the Netherlands, 
New South Wales, Australia, and . . . Canada expressly allow forms of MDPs. Similarly, 
some countries such as France permit a variation of MDPs by allowing captive law firm 
arrangements. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers in Paris has entered one of these 
arrangements—the firms are separate but they share clients, office space, supplies, 
telephones, and computers . . . Moreover, other countries are considering permitting MDPs on 
some level. 
Id. 
 116. Id. 
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In fact, this approach would work in Japan as well. Japan, like the 
United States, suffered an economic downturn that was caused by 
questionable accounting practices, which lawmakers attempted to fix 
through a confusing web of regulation and deregulation. MDPs would 
have been a more productive solution.  
Of course, “some countries have voiced opinions against the 
establishment of MDPs,”117 and there are criticisms related to the 
implementation of MDPs in the United States as well. Many note that the 
“inconsistent role of auditor and advocate” will lead to breaches of 
confidentiality and a decrease in competence.118 But, the accounting 
industry is sensitive to the client’s need for confidentiality. In the 
standards governing CPAs, there are provisions requiring accountants to 
consult their clients when the disclosure of information is needed.119 In 
addition, the mere fact that an attorney works in an accounting firm does 
not relieve the attorney from the burden of the rules of legal ethics.120 
Involving more professions and individuals in the audit practice reduces 
the possibility of illegal accounting practices. This is not to say that some 
regulation of MDPs would not be needed,121 but that, ultimately, the 
solution will work.  
 117. Coffin, supra note 92, at 39 (reporting that Dutch leaders argued that MDPs would violate 
anti-trust laws). 
 118. See Coffin, supra note 92, at 39–40 (observing that possible disadvantages of MDPs include 
“increased conflicts of interest and loss of confidentiality”); Yarbrough, supra note 97, at 653–55.  
 119. Id. at 657. “[A] CPA must obtain client consent before disclosing information or he or she 
will be subject to discipline by the AICPA and a potential damages award.” Id.  
 120. Id. at 658. “[A]n attorney working in an MDP would still be required to keep client 
information confidential and would still be protected by the attorney client privilege.” Id.  
 121. Prince supra note 98, at 275. The regulatory solution would be to put all lawyers, no matter 
where they practice, on the same playing field. “Lawyers in non-lawyer controlled MDPs should be 
treated the same as lawyers practicing in lawyer-controlled MDPs.” Id. “The Commission erred when 
it created different regulatory schemes for non-lawyer controlled and lawyer-controlled MDPs. The 
Commission should not impose a burden on attorneys practicing in an MDP setting when it fails to 
impose the same burden on lawyers in all other settings.” Id. at 276.  
 New York State has already adopted legal ethics rules that deal with MDPs. Manuel del Valle, 
New York Adopts Multi-Disciplinary Practice Rules, 314 PLI/EST 641, 665 (2002). “The new rules 
. . . allow for limited, strictly business alliances between attorneys and non-attorneys and are 
constructed around two basic precepts: preservation of core values of the legal profession and the best 
interests of the client.” Id. The rule 
makes clear that non-lawyers cannot direct or regulate the professional judgment of lawyers 
in rendering legal services or take any action that would compromise an attorney’s ability to 
protect client confidences. It explains the circumstances under which the Code of Professional 
Responsibility applies to a lawyer or law firms providing nonlegal services. 
Id. at 666. New York attorneys have taken the bold step that all attorneys need to take in recognizing 
their clients’ needs, recognizing that “strategic ventures are here to stay[.]” Id. With these progressive 
steps and favorable laws, it is possible that New York will be the breeding ground for MDPs in the 
21st century just as Delaware has been the preferred state of incorporation for the past century. See 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p937 Morrison.doc 7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
960 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:937 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Japan and the United States are in similar predicaments. MDPs are the 
global answer to controversies created by questionable accounting 
practices. Legislators must stop falling into the same traps of rotating 
between eras of regulation and deregulation and find a way to effectuate 
positive change. Multidisciplinary practices represent the type of 
alternative solution to which lawmakers should be looking. 
MDPs offer the benefits of integration, which include greater 
accountability, more comprehensive services for customers, and a new job 
market for both lawyers and accountants. Although some may criticize 
these practices, the arguments upon which they typically rely are flawed. 
First, both the legal and accounting profession have ethics rules that 
address confidentiality issues. Accountants have a duty to obtain client 
consent similar to the attorney-client privilege of legal ethics before any 
information can be disclosed. Second, an attorney’s competency could 
only increase as a result of involvement in MDPs. Involving both 
professions in transactions will help the professionals to better understand 
the transactions they are administering. Each profession possesses 
knowledge that is beneficial to the other.  
This proposed solution does not include integration for all business 
practices. Conflicts of interest still exist when an accounting firm offers 
consulting advice to an audit client. Therefore, the accounting firms have 
taken the proactive step of withdrawing from the consulting market or 
separating any consulting practice from their accounting practices.  
MDPs are the wave of the future and the United States and Japan 
should rush to implement them. MDPs are new and progressive practices, 
and it is only with forward-thinking that the law can improve. The 
legislatures of both the United States and Japan need to abandon the 
default regulatory practices that have proven ineffective in the past and 
devise new strategies to create positive economic effects. This change is 
necessary not only for both countries’ domestic economies but for the 
global economy as well.  
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